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1. Introduction - Harm, Wrongdoing and The Imagination
When a tyrant imagines his mortal enemy being destroyed in an unpleasant way he might not
necessarily wish that enemy real harm, or indeed wish anything truly awful to happen to them at
all. Likewise, I can claim to think about murdering someone without actually being compelled
to commit murder. What occurs in these situations is an act of `immoral imagining'1, the
entertaining in thought of actions or activities considered morally wrong. The fact that the
immoral acts are restricted to the imagination in these cases might suggest that what occurs is
harmless but this is not, and should not be the case. Indeed, it has not always been the case
at all. Within the Treason Act of 1351, there is the statement When a man doth compass or
imagine the Death or our Lord the king ... that ... ought to be judged Treason.2 The suggestion
is that simply thinking about the death of the king is enough to be held accountable for Treason.
Legally then, in 1351 someone might be arrested and punished for thinking about the death of
the king; not actually trying to kill, or wanting the king dead, but simply entertaining the
thought of the king being dead. On the face of it, this thirteenth century law seems absurd; if
the king is not harmed, there appears no logic in punishing someone for treason. There is no
victim here, nobody appears to suffer as a result of imagining the king dead.
At face value, there appears little justification in outlawing behaviour that doesn't actually
harm anyone else. However, immoral imagining is not something which can be judged purely in
terms of harm, it is an act of a personal nature which calls into question the morality of those
who entertain immoral thoughts. I would like to suggest that when I imagine something morally
unacceptable I bring into disrepute the nature of myself as a morally sound person. So, the
disgruntled peasant of 1351 who imagines the death of the king would not only be punished,
but damage too their own moral character as a result of what they imagined. What we imagine
should not be free of moral assessment purely because it is not real. Just because we cannot
attach harm, or indeed a victim to what we imagine is no grounds with which to deem imaginings
a harmless act. When we imagine acts which would be morally wrong if carried out, we commit
1 At this stage the term `immoral imagining' is used as a name alone rather than assuming it immoral to
imagine certain things. Fuller discussion of this term will come later in the paper.
2 `Revised Statute from The UK Statute Law Database, Treason Act 1351 (c. 2)'
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/RevisedStatutes/Acts/aep/1351/caep_13510002_enm_1> [accessed 15 May 2009].
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an act of `harmless wrongdoing'. This seemingly harmless act of imagination is one which we
might still deem wrong, or attach `wrongness' to. The purpose of this paper will be to prove
that immoral imagining is an example of harmless wrongdoing. This will be shown in a two
step argument. Firstly, it will be proven that immoral imagining is wrong, and secondly that
the pursuit of the immoral imagination within virtual worlds is wrong too. It is within virtual
worlds that immoral imaginings might easily be indulged, so this is where the assessment of
immoral imaginings and their nature as morally wrong will be focussed upon.
2. Feinberg's Harmless Wrongdoing
In ordinary usage, there is a tendency to associate wrongful acts with the concept of harm. An
act is considered a wrong one on the basis of it being harmful, and of causing harm to someone
in some way. This also implies the need for a victim for an act to be considered harmful, but this
is an unreasonable association. As Feinberg points out, harm is both vague and ambiguous, and
entangled with other concepts, like wrong.3 This being the case, it is unnecessary that harm
always exist for an act to be deemed wrong. There can be wrongs without harm. A person can
commit a wrongful act without that act necessarily being a harmful one too. Feinberg struggles
to present examples for this claim, conceding that there are also examples, though less common
ones, of wrongs that are not harms.4 In the introduction to a volume on `harmless wrongdoing',
Feinberg presents very few examples of wrongful acts without harm, and speculates towards
the possible existence of others. Feinberg's key example is that of consensual homosexual acts
between adults. This may be considered wrong because of the biblical injunction it defies; the
act itself is devoid of victims, thus the act is wrong but harmless overall.
This notion of harmless wrongdoing is one which raises much debate and Feinberg admits
that the idea is controversial among moral philosophers.5 This controversy exists as a result of
the difficulty involved in formulating examples of harmless wrongdoings. As Feinberg suggests, it
is more difficult to present examples of harmless wrongdoings than it is to theorise the existence
of the term. Feinberg's own example of consensual homosexual sex between adults raises some
questions over the nature of harmless wrongdoing and how the term may be defined. There are
many people who do not believe in the biblical injunction that Feinberg relies on, enough for
there to be a substantial amount of people who would not consider consensual homosexual sex a
case of harmless wrongdoing at all. Indeed, even if one is Christian, and believes that homosexual
activity is wrong, then the consenting adults in the example actually do harm themselves. They
commit a sin, and therefore damage their souls, so there is actually harm. Thus, if one is a
Christian, no harm exists, and if one is a non-believer (and does not believe homosexuality to
be wrong), then no wrong exists. This may seem problematic, but these are cases where harm
is `harm to oneself'. This is an important point since Feinberg's example may appear to fall
into the trap of being harmful to oneself, and is therefore not a harmless wrongdoing at all, but
harm to the self does not count towards cases of harmless wrongdoing. A harmless wrongdoing
3 Joel Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing: The Moral Limits of The Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988), xxvii.
4 ibid, xxviii.
5 ibid.
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only refers to wrongdoing where no second or third parties are harmed. Failure to recognise this
point makes it far too easy to criticise examples of harmless wrongdoing on the basis that they
involve harms to the self.
Therefore, an act of a harmless wrongdoing necessitates the following factors: the morally
illicit act in question does not adversely affect anyone's interests ... furthermore, it is wrong
without wronging any victim.6 Taking this definition as a starting point, the aim of this paper
will be to provide an example of harmless wrongdoing, and in doing so prove that the notion is not
as controversial as Feinberg suggests. Under Feinberg's model, there are two clear characteristics
in examples which constitute a harmless wrongdoing. Firstly, that an act does not adversely
affect anyone's interests, and secondly that the act be wrong without actually wronging any
victim.
3. Age Play - The Immoral Imagination
`Age-play' within a virtual world will be forwarded here as an example of harmless wrongdoing,
and it will be shown that the example is in possession of Feinberg's characteristics. In a virtual
world such as Second Life there are instances where real harm is apparent, but these are in-
stances of harmful wrongdoing rather than harmless wrongdoing. Second Life is a virtual world
simultaneously accessed by multiple users by way of avatars that they create themselves. By
October of last year, Second Life had over fifteen million users.7 The Official Guide to Second
Life defines itself as a virtual world ... It's your virtual life.8 Users can buy land in Second
Life, marry each other or engage in other pastimes that we take for granted in real life. These
are realistic engagements between real people, involving real currency and real binding agree-
ments. In such cases, the actions that users take within the virtual world are realistic, they have
real consequences and can be realistically harmful to those behind the avatars involved in an
agreement or a marriage. Second Life's very own slogan states `Your World. Your Imagination'.
The slogan implies that there are not always instances where real harm can be attributed to
virtual interactions. If Second Life is an imaginative world, then that which goes on inside it can
also involve imaginative constructs, fantasy and those actions which might be impossible in real
life. It is this type of interaction which relates to immoral imagining and harmless wrongdoing,
because acts within the virtual world are harmless but may still be considered wrong.
`Age play' is a regressive role-play in which adults take on the role of children. This can
involve sexual role-play in which adults pretend to be a parent and child in order to engage in
a shared sexual fantasy. Within a virtual world, this takes the form of two consenting adults,
most commonly one with an adult avatar and one with an avatar designed to resemble a child.
Age play occurs between two consenting adults, one of whom takes on the role of a child, and
the other takes on the role of a caretaker.9 Users of a virtual world may then take the adult
6 ibid.
7 `Second Life Appoints New Euro Chief to Boost Business', MarketingWeek (2008)
<http://www.marketingweek.co.uk/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=63112&d=258&h=262&f=3> [accessed 17 May 2009].
8 Michael Rymaszewski, Wagner James Au, Mark Wallace, Catherine Winters, Philip Rosedale, Cory Ondrejka,
Benjamin Batstone-Cunningham, Second Life: The Official Guide (Wiley-Interscience, 2006), p. 4.
9 `Age Play', Conversation Between 'Claudia' and 'nethacker' regarding age play and what it entails (1999)
<http://www.iron-rose.com/IR/docs/ageplay.htm> [accessed 15 May 2009].
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and child-like avatars and engage in simulated sexual acts with them. The very nature of an
avatar implies that there be a human being in charge of it, and that someone is responsible for
the actions that an avatar undertakes. Behind every avatar is a person, a link between reality
and the virtual world which is plainly obvious. An avatar has been defined as a perceptible
digital representation whose behaviours reflect those executed, typically in real time, by a specific
human being.10 If a child were to be in control of one of the avatars in the age play example,
the act of engaging in simulated intercourse would be problematic, because a child is involved.
No real child is involved or harmed in age play fantasies because two adults control the avatars
engaged in the sexual act. This fact should not make the act any less morally problematic than
a case where a real child is involved.
The morally problematic issue therefore appears as a result of what resembles a child taking
part in a virtual sex act. This brings about the first of Feinberg's characteristics, that an act
does not adversely affect anyone's interests for it to be considered a harmless wrongdoing. In
the case of age-play, it is evident that the act has no negative effect upon the interests of any
party, since it is between two consenting adults; the only issue at hand is the fact that one of
the avatars resembles a child and the association this brings to morally wrong acts is a troubling
one. Intuition tells us that `age play' is morally wrong, and the reason for this must be made
clearer. The second of Feinberg's characteristics, that the act be wrong without wronging any
victim is of greater importance than the first and will be focussed upon in order to address the
intuitive feeling of moral wrongness associated with `age play' and why this counts towards the
act being a harmless wrongdoing.
It remains unclear why exactly we should react negatively towards age play since it is a
seemingly harmless act; an example of an act considered wrong without any real harm occurring.
If it is clear why `age play' may be considered harmless, it is now important to distinguish why
it can be considered wrong. When a subject merely imagines something as morally wrong as
having sex with a child, there need not be a real life intention in existence. The subject need
not necessarily want to have sex with a child, but they have entertained the thought in their
imagination. Similarly, when two users engage in an age play scenario in a virtual world there
need not be any real life intentions towards real children, but the act is an imaginative concept
brought into a virtual world. This in itself is enough for a subject to be at fault morally, and for
the act to be considered a wrong one. The reason for this stems from the accountability of moral
imaginings - the idea that acts of imagination are morally assessable. In other words, those who
entertain morally troubling concepts in imagination should be held accountable. Kendall Walton
believes this to be the case for the reason that adoptive imagination is a morally corrupting
process, stating it can be wrong to adopt even in the imagination a moral view that I reject in
reality.11 Walton uses the term `moral view' to refer to those morally problematic views that
people might accept in their imagination, but would reject in reality. An example is a claim
such as: `The Holocaust was a good thing'. This is an view that we might accept in imagination
when reading fictions, but in reality, are most likely to reject. Age players may not adopt any
10 Jeremy Bailenson, & Jim Blascovich, Avatars. In W. S. Bainbridge (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Human Computer
Interaction (Great Barrington, MA: Berkshire, 2004), p. 65.
11 Kendall L. Walton and Michael Tanner, `Morals In Fiction and Fictional Morality', Proceedings of the Aris-
totelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 68 (1994), p. 34.
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specific moral view, but they do adopt an imaginative pretence to morally problematic actions.
In other words, the age player entertains in their imagination an action which would be wrong
were it to be carried out in real life.
Walton holds that we have reasons to resist immoral imaginings of the type age play represent
because such imaginings can affect our moral `orientation'. By accepting moral views we know to
be morally problematic we disorient our moral compass, as Walton puts it, and are drawn towards
immoral concepts which would otherwise be repugnant. By adopting a view in imagination that is
troubling in moral terms, I "might change my moral orientation; it might in this sense `pervert the
sentiments of my heart'."12 Walton suggests that merely entertaining immoral thoughts can have
an effect upon a person's morality, and that the process of adoptive imagining itself is corrupting.
This being the case, it is up to the individual to effectively resist morally problematic imaginings
in order to protect themselves from the corruption of moral values that Walton believes possible.
In terms of the age play example, it is therefore necessary for individuals to resist such a morally
troubling imagining, rather than actively engaging it. The notion of `imaginative resistance' is
one Richard Moran also discusses. According to Moran, `imaginative resistance' occurs when an
individual refuses to entertain or adopt immoral imaginings or moral responses the individual
deems inappropriate.13 As morally accountable human beings, we therefore have a responsibility
to resist immoral thoughts in order to protect our own moral characters. Those who fail to resist
certain imaginings, and habitually entertain immoral imaginings are those with a moral character
flaw. Age players fall into this category. The flaw of the age player is to entertain the morally
problematic notion of a child as sexual object. No real child is harmed and the age player need
not wish to have sex with a child in reality, but age play fantasy involves someone pretending to
be a child, and using the child-like avatar to engage in a virtual sexual act. This sexualisation
of a child is an immoral imagining, and failure to reject this amounts to a failure of a persons
imaginative resistance. Essentially, the age player fails to resist the immoral imagining of age
play and what the act entails.
The failure of age players to resist and reject such immoral imaginings implies that their
actions are habitual. Moral judgement is usually reserved for examples of habit, and not for
individual instances of emotions or passions. Amy Mullin draws from the Aristotelian notion
that it is not only an individuals actions which are morally assessable, but their dispositions
too.14 In doing so, Mullin suggests that Aristotle's conception of dispositions can be applied
to acts of imagination. This implies that the imagination provides evidence of an individual's
dispositions, and should therefore be morally assessable too. This is an important point, and
one which goes some way to providing the necessary evidence for the moral accountability of the
imagination. From this the reason why immoral imaginative concepts like that of age play can
be considered wrong, becomes apparent. According to Mullin: habitual acts of imagination,
such as those that involve sexual exploitation of children, do seem clear instances of flaws in
12 ibid.
13 Richard Moran, `The Expression of Feeling in Imagination', The Philosophical Review, 103, I (1994), pp.
75-106.
14 Amy Mullin, `Moral Defects, Aesthetic Defects, and the Imagination', The Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism, 62, III (2004), p. 252.
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one's own moral character.15 Age play is an example of an act of imagination which Mullin
suggests can provide evidence of a moral character flaw. Imaginings can be partly constitutive
of dispositions, thus if a persons dispositions can be morally assessed then such an example of
habitual immoral imagination is also morally assessable.
Indeed, that imaginings partly constitute dispositions and their morally assessable nature can
be seen to be supposed in our present Judicial system. There is clear evidence that imaginative
content plays a role in character assessment, implying that the imagination is open to moral
assessment in a way that represents its influence on the nature of a person as a virtuous character.
As a form of punishment, the offenders of specifically harmful acts commonly enter a process
of rehabilitation. This places great emphasis upon not only what the culprit does, but also
what they entertain in mere thought. If a murderer is incarcerated for committing murder their
possible release is dependent upon the likelihood that they will re-offend, and if they present any
danger to the public. This likelihood is measured by study of the inmate's behaviour, but also of
their mental state. The inmate who no longer entertains the thought of killing is more likely to
be released than the one who still does. Of course, people can lie about having these thoughts,
but consider it to be the case that we can determine when people have certain thoughts about
doing bad things and when they do not. If an offender commonly thinks about murdering people
then this seems enough to deny their release. If we did not obviously place high importance upon
that which we merely entertain in thought, then this state of affairs would not exist and the
offenders with and without murderous imaginings would have an equal chance of being released.
In this example, the imaginative content of the murderer is taken to imply their disposition
towards murdering again. This is a case of the imagination being morally assessed, and one which
suggests that people are indeed accountable for their imaginative content. The inmate who does
not imagine committing murder again is one who displays the imaginative resistance that was
evidently not in place when they committed their original crime. The inmate who entertains the
thought of murdering again shows that their character is morally flawed in the way that Mullin
suggests. The habitual entertainment of immoral thoughts implies that the individual is more
open to the immoral, and as such their disposition towards murdering again appears more likely.
To imagine murdering someone is therefore wrong firstly because the idea of murder itself is
morally wrong, and secondly because the entertainment of such an immoral imagining results in
the corruption of moral character. This is another example of a seemingly harmless imaginative
act which can actually be morally assessed, considered wrong and the imaginer held accountable
for. If imaginings can be partly constitutive of dispositions, the implication for age players is a
damning one.
Just as the murderer that entertains the thought of murder is deemed more likely to commit a
crime, the age player that entertains the immoral idea of simulated child molestation is disposed
towards immoral acts, and more likely to entertain similar immoral thoughts. As Mullin suggests,
repeated adoption in the imagination of an immoral perspective might have morally damaging
effects.16 This being the case, to adopt the imaginative content that age players do is to entertain
the `immoral perspective', and therefore destroy the `moral innocence' that we otherwise have.
15 ibid.
16 ibid.
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Furthermore, Mullin believes that the habitual adoption of an immoral imagination will not only
lead to character flaws, it will ultimately confuse our moral sensitivities, and disorient our moral
compass in the way Walton has suggested. To entertain notions such as those involved in age
play or the imagination of murder will inevitably lead to a failure to recognise when immoral
things are happening.17 The fact that immoral imaginings such as those age play involves can
lead to a degradation of ones moral character is the reason that they may be considered wrong.
Age players appear to repeatedly adopt an immoral perspective which Mullin believes leads to
the moral damage suggested here.
It is morally wrong to merely imagine immoral concepts then, because the entertainment
of such concepts result in a dissolution of moral character. The failure to practice imaginative
resistance is to exhibit this moral character failing. To lose sight of what is morally right
and wrong, and display the inability to distinguish between the two is an example of moral
insensitivity. Jacobson makes a similar point in a paper distinguishing between morally sensitive
and virtuous people.18 This distinction shows why we should practice imaginative resistance,
and why those who do not display moral character failings.19
In an appeal to Moran-style imaginative resistance, Jacobson makes the following definition:
the virtuous audience will resist feeling ... what they deem it wrong to feel; while a morally
sensitive audience will be unable to feel that way.20 Related back to the age play example,
the virtuous audience are those that view age play negatively, refusing to engage the immoral
imaginative concepts related to it. Naturally, this means that the sensitive audience are those
that simply cannot entertain age play in any way, even in imagination. The virtuous audience
have the ability to entertain the idea of age play, their virtue stems from the fact they are able
to resist feeling anything towards it, because they know it to be wrong. Jacobson also believes
that enough practice in resistance might, through habituation, make a virtuous spectator into
a morally sensitive one.21 This mirrors in the opposite direction, Mullin's point that habitual
immoral imagination can lead to character flaws. The habitual resistance of immoral thoughts
leads to a stage where we are simply unable to entertain immoral ideas at all. It is preferential
that people go through this evolution; the morally sensitive person is of sounder moral character
than the virtuous person. It is better to be unable to entertain the immoral than it is to have to
resist, and be open to resistive failure. If it is a character flaw to habitually entertain immoral
imaginings, as Mullin suggests, then the inability to entertain them at all suggests a character
virtue. This being the case, the age player, and those who entertain such immoral imaginings
display an insensitivity which implies they may never become morally sensitive persons in the
sense Jacobson implies. Just as the murderer who imagines murdering again is held accountable
for being more likely disposed to murdering, the age player is more disposed to immoral concepts.
Age players fail to resist immoral imaginings when they engage their fantasies within a virtual
17 ibid.
18 Daniel Jacobson, `In Praise of Immoral Art', Philosophical Topics, 25, I (1997), pp. 155-199.
19 Of course, this might be an example of harm to the self, and in imagining certain things I harm my own
moral character, but this is still an example of a harmless wrongdoing, as the imaginative act harms no 2nd or 3rd
parties but is still wrong. This victim cannot be the self; there must be a wrongdoing without harm to another
party for the example to be one of harmless wrongdoing and this is the case here.
20 Jacobson, `In Praise of Immoral Art', Philosophical Topics, 25, I (1997), p. 186.
21 ibid.
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world. An age player pursues their imagining, wishing it to become more than just an imagining;
they display a disposition towards the sexualisation of children in the virtual world. This means
they are unable to work towards being a morally sensitive spectator due to their consistent
engagement of the immoral imagination.
Everyone has a moral duty to behave in a certain way, to adhere to specific moral guidelines in
their everyday conduct. There are specific acts and actions which are deemed immoral, and the
virtuous person can recognise these, and actively resist committing them. The morally sensitive
amongst us are simply unable to entertain anything they consider immoral, this inability shows
that they have a strong moral character. These people need not resist the immoral, since the
inclination towards it is not there. Age players then, are those with the character flaws that
render them immoral people. The murderer up for parole is morally insensitive if they imagine
murdering once released. This is because they fail to resist immoral imaginings, and actively
engage the immoral imagining, suggesting they would, or are likely to, re- offend. Such a person
cannot become morally sensitive since the fact that they display no imaginative resistance to the
immoral thought of murder and habitually entertain the thought instead implies Mullin's `flaws
in moral character'. Similarly, age players do the same.
As Seiriol Morgan suggests, the complex and frequently dark nature of human sexual desire
requires a certain kind of ethical sensitivity from us, and also places upon us obligations not to act
on certain sexual impulses we might have.22 As cited from Mullin earlier acts of imagination
that involve sexual exploitation of children, do seem clear instances of flaws in one's moral
character.23 While age play does not involve real children, and is therefore not strictly of
the imaginative type Mullin suggests, it does qualify as one of the `dark desires' that Morgan
believes we should not entertain, and refrain from acting upon. Age play is a fantasy, in which
its participants simulate the molestation of a child. No child is harmed by what exists as an
imagination within a virtual world. It is however, a fantasy which appears to go against the idea
of imaginative resistance, and is one that the morally sensitive person would clearly be unable
to entertain. As moral beings we have the ability to distinguish between right and wrong, good
and bad. in the first instance it is up to us to distinguish between good desires and bad desires.
Then it is necessary to know that bad desires should not be acted upon, and that we should
only entertain desires we deem good. Once we make this distinction, its is imaginative resistance
that stops us from pursuing bad desires. Age players then, lack the moral sensitivity Morgan
believes necessary to distinguish between dark and acceptable desires. Not only this, age players
fail to resist immoral imaginings because of this, and as a result the distinction between good
(acceptable) and bad (dark) desires is blurred. Since the age player engages a bad desire when
they pursue their fantasy in a virtual world their imaginative resistance has failed, as well as
calling into question their ability to distinguish between right and wrong desires in the first place.
Relying on a Kantian notion, Morgan believes our propensity towards certain desires can be
shaped by imagination, which is similar to the Aristotelian point of dispositions being partly
formed by the imagination: motives emerge from our freedom and are potentially reshaped into
22 Seiriol Morgan, `Dark Desires', Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 6, IV (2003), p. 378
23 Mullin, p. 252.
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more complex forms by imagination.24 Kant refers to passions as `Leidenschaft', and believes
that these passions are difficult to control through reason. Suggesting that our passions come
from our nature as free, sociable creatures, Kant refers to the conflict that exists in society
between the free creatures as they attempt to impose their will upon others in order to gratify
their passions. This gives rise to a kind of primal conflict in human society in which people are
subordinated and treated as a means to their own ends.25 Kant concludes from this state of
affairs that A desire which has become habitual is an inclination.26 The imaginative desire that
age players feel is of a morally troubling nature that suitably fits Kant and Morgan's concerns.
It is a desire as habitual as the murderer imagining murdering as to become a disposition, an
inclination, and one that proves the individual that has that desire to be morally flawed. There
are certain desires, and imaginative concepts we have a duty to resist at the least, and completely
reject at best. Since immoral imagining is morally corrupting to moral character, to entertain
the idea of age play is wrong. Age players fail to resist immoral imaginings and their own moral
sensitivity in favour of pursuing a fantasy. Not only this, the nature of age play implies that it
may well be even more difficult for reason to control than Kant suggests. Age players habitually
pursue their fantasy in a virtual world where they can visualise and interact with likeminded
individuals in order to make their fantasy something more than just an imagining. Clearly then,
the age play fantasy does not just exist in the mind. Due to this, it appears that it will be more
difficult for reason to control the fantasy, since the extent of the fantasy is much greater than
anything that might exist in the mind alone. Kant's conflict therefore encompasses the nature
of age play and why it is rejected by morally discerning individuals. If reason has difficulty in
controlling purely imaginative fantasies as Kant suggests, then fantasies engaged within virtual
worlds, which are of a more active nature, must be even harder to control.
The intuitive feeling of wrongness felt when presented with what age play involves is moral
sensitivity coming into play. Just as the morally sensitive individual can reject imagining murder
because they know it to be wrong, they can reject age play because it carries the same feeling
of wrongness. To entertain immoral imaginings is therefore to pursue a desire that becomes
habitual, providing assessable evidence of an individual inclination towards the immoral. Since
the immoral imagination is corrupting, and hence morally assessable it is morally wrong to
imagine certain activities. Age play is once such activity. An age player displays no imaginative
resistance, and therefore does not have the feeling that what they do is wrong. This represents
the conflict which exists in those virtuous enough to reject the idea, and those age players
devoid of the moral sensitivity to do the same. To entertain certain immoral thoughts shows an
insensitive moral character, and it is certainly a step further to act out these imaginings in the
way age players do.
Age play might be a harmless acting out of an imagining, devoid of a victim, but is still a
wrongful act. Morgan suggests that: behaviour that would make one person very unhappy can
leave another entirely unconcerned, and it is hard to tell what will upset who.27 Despite this,
24 Morgan, p. 384.
25 ibid.
26 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. By Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), p. 12.
27 Morgan, p. 406.
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there are sill `paradigm cases' with which we can shape our moral reasoning. Notions such as
murder, rape, and paedophilia are examples of such cases, moral concepts abhorrent enough that
they can be used as benchmarks for moral rights and wrongs. It is fair to say that imagining rape,
murder and paedophilia will make the majority of people `unhappy', if not morally outraged.
Since the habitual entertainment of such imaginings leads to damage of moral character, immoral
imaginings are wrong. This being the case, age players not only commit wrongful acts when they
engage in fantasies within a virtual world, they take an immoral imagining further by actively
pursuing it, representing it in a virtual world. Virtual worlds, like the real world, are not risk
free and are certainly not free of moral assessment. If the imagination can be morally assessed,
as has been forwarded, then the virtual world is a way of representing this morally assessable
imagination, and acting upon what once existed only in the mind. For this reason, it is wrong to
act upon imaginings as age players do within a virtual world, because the imagination is morally
accountable.
4. Age Play - Virtual Worlds And The Pursuit of Fantasy
The accountability of the imagination suggests that the mind, and virtual world should not
provide a free pass to do whatever one pleases, then defend this by simply stating that nobody
has been harmed. Adopted immoral imaginings are character corrupting, and to adopt in thought
ideas which are immoral is a damaging process. The virtual world provides freedom to an extent
not possible in the real world. Within it, fantasies and desires can be pursued without the
condemnation they would receive were they pursued in the real world. Age players do not
therefore, face the moral analysis they would face in the real world, they can act upon their
fantasies in relative privacy, within a virtual world. The virtual world is not however, risk
free in the same sense that a properly fictional world can be said to be. Walton suggests that
the divergence between fictionality and truth spares us pain and suffering we would have to
experience in the real world. We realize some of the benefits of hard experience without having
to under go it.28 This contrasts somewhat with the nature of a virtual world. In imagined cases,
and within Walton's fictional worlds, I am free of the guilt, fear and pain that I might otherwise
experience had my experience been real. A fictional world is therefore risk free in the sense that
it allows agents to experience and undergo emotions without fear of repercussions; the agent is
not damaged or hurt by the victory of the blood thirsty tyrant onscreen or on the page as they
would be had the tyrant literally rampaged through their town. This much is obvious, and it
is fair to conclude from these points that a fictional world is a harmless construct of a purely
imaginary nature. A virtual world, on the other hand, might be similarly harmless, but it is not
risk free, or free from moral assessment in the same way fictions are.
The virtual world provides a tool with which moral imaginings might be acted out, or rep-
resented. Imaginative objects of fantasy and desire; of actions rejected in reality might easily
be pursued. By signing up to a virtual world, registering a username and creating an avatar,
an individual is engaging in something more than just lazily sitting around imagining a morally
problematic concept. It is easy enough for any individual to be told to `imagine yourself killing
28 Kendall L. Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts (Harvard:
Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 68.
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your worst enemy', but this is different from engaging an imagining of this nature by seeking
to pursue it with likeminded individuals. Indeed, while it might seem for the briefest of mo-
ments desirable to think of your worst enemy dead, out of your life and therefore not a problem
anymore, a common sense morality stops the virtuous person from taking such an imagining
any further. Indeed, such imaginings simply exist as fleeting moments of entertained fantasy
and do not form the basis of anything that an individual might be judged upon seriously. It
would be irrational to judge someone who briefly imagines their worst enemy dead as having
murderous intentions generally. Even the most virtuous of human beings can entertain such
immoral thoughts. The difference lies in assessing those willing to act on immoral imaginings,
or at least pursue an imagining to the extent they appear to be willing to act, in some way, to
make it more than an imagining.
Fantasy, originating from the Greek word phantasia refers to our ability to entertain images
and ideas. The lively imagination ... can vividly represent ... things, voices, or actions with
the exactness of reality, and this faculty may readily be acquired by ourselves if we desire it.29
This definition of the imagination and the ability it holds to entertain subjects which do not
exist in reality leads to another Greek word phantazethia: a verb used specifically ... for the
faculty of entertaining appearances.30 This suggests fantasy, especially imaginative fantasy, to
be a means of picturing oneself in a certain way. This is certainly true of age players engaging
in fantasy within a virtual world. Age players take on character roles, picturing themselves as
a child, or a parent as part of their collective fantasy. More than this, age players not only
imagine themselves in a way different to their own reality, they represent themselves in the form
of avatars which resemble their imaginative constructs. By entering a virtual world in order to
engage their fantasy, an age player must register a username, create an avatar and learn how
to use the virtual world. This is different to merely imagining an age play scenario, this is the
active pursuit of the scenario itself. An age play fantasy, as a product of the imagination, affords
those who engage it a gratification of desires otherwise held internal.
Age play in a virtual world is much different to simply sexualising a child in the mind. The
virtual world provides props that assist the fantasy, making it something more realistic, and more
tangible than any imaginative construct can be. The malleable nature a of virtual world allows
people to design their avatar to suit specific individual desires. In Second Life an avatar can be
customised to resemble a child or take on any number of features the user dictates. Certainly,
the mind affords us a similar level of creative freedom, but the mind is closed to others, the
virtual world is much more social in nature. The age player is not just one person engaging a
fantasy for their own benefit, they interact collectively as a community all pursuing gratification
of a shared fantasy. It is the more complex nature of the pursuit of immoral fantasies in virtual
world which makes them even more wrong than immoral imaginings. The sustained engagement
of age play in this way shows the willingness of individuals to go against typical moral judgement
in favour of an immoral fantasy. Age players effectively place themselves into the imaginative
fantasy in a similar way that Moran believes dramatic imagination involves adopting a point of
29 Quintilian, `Instituio Oratoria' (2006) <http://honeyl.public.iastate.edu/quintilian/6/chapter2.html#29>
[accessed 17 May 2009] (para. 10 of 12).
30 Eva T.H. Brann, The World of The Imagination: Sum and Substance (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 1990),
p. 21.
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view different to ones own.31
Dramatic imagining consists in the imaginative adoption of and identification with a certain
point of view different from one's own. As mentioned previously, such adopted perspectives lead a
related disposition. Thus, imaginatively adopting such a point of view usually involves imagining
the respective evaluative and affective responses to given situations, and there is an awareness of
what the imagining entails. Moran likens dramatic imagination to empathy, since we essentially
place ourselves in somebody else's shoes when we imagine in this way. Furthermore, Moran
believes that because of dramatic imagination it could be easy to lose track of the difference
between ... fantasy and acting out32 The age player, therefore, does not simply accept idle
propositions in the way that a daydreamer may entertain sexual fantasies. Their imagining is of
the dramatic sort since they actively attempt to act out their fantasy, placing themselves into
a virtual world in order to accomplish this. Since fantasies of the purely imaginative sort have
already been proven to be morally problematic the pursuit of them in a virtual world is even
more reprehensible.
Richard Wollheim gives the example of the erotic daydreamer to suggest that Moran is correct
in stating that dramatic imagining may lead to confusion between fantasy and acting out. The
erotic daydreamer imagines themselves engaged in sexual activity, and in doing so imagines
themselves being sexually aroused. As the daydreamer imagines themselves being aroused they
will actually become aroused in reality.33 Wollheim believes this suggests that imagination can
provide real emotions. If this is so then the imagination is quite clearly corrupting. If the
example were changed to one which is morally problematic, unlike Wollheim's, then the arousal
that results from the fantasy would be condemned. If we can condemn an imagination for causing
this corruption in the immoral case, then we can certainly condemn those that take fantasies
a step further into the virtual world. The erotic daydreamer is simply entertaining something
in thought, and this happens to lead to arousal, as is the case when people imagine sexually
appealing situations. This is very much different to the age player. Certainly, they will have the
imaginative experience that leads to arousal in the same way as the erotic daydreamer, but the
age player does even more than this. The virtual world provides a means to pursue this arousal,
and satisfy themselves by indulging in the imaginative act in a way which can provide them
with something more like the active experience they crave. This craving leads to the pursuit of
the fantasy, and is not the same as passing time by daydreaming about things you might find
arousing.
An age player pursues their fantasy because it appeals in the imagination, and this fantasy is
difficult to control. It is because of imagination that people wish to age play, without it reason
might easier overcome the desire and fantasy that imagination fuels. Indeed, without an imagi-
nation and without the ability to engage fantasy Adam might not have eaten the forbidden fruit.
An imaginative faculty can tempt one in ways that would otherwise be unsuitable, as Richard
Kearney suggests Adam was attracted to the forbidden fruit because he had imagination. Each
time they felt tempted to exercise their fantasy, Adam's descendants strayed off the path.34
31 Moran, p. 104.
32 ibid.
33 Richard Wollheim, The Thread of Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 81-82.
34 Richard Kearney, The Wake of Imagination (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 39-43.
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This picture implies that fantasies and the imagination house concepts that are otherwise closed
to us, and that the imagination can be corrupting because imagination allows us to entertain
concepts we might otherwise refuse or reject in reality. This is not to condemn imagination in
general as corrupting, since without imagination we could not perceive the world around us or
have access to the creative faculties which allow us to express ourselves.
To age play in a virtual world is therefore to engage an imaginative fantasy, and actively
pursue the fantasy into the virtual world. There are parts of the age play fantasy that appeal
to those of deficient moral character (the role of dominator/domineer), and parts which should
be quite obviously immoral (the fact that the act consists of simulated child molestation). The
positive aspect of the fantasy exists because imagination allows us to toy with ideas we might
otherwise reject. Fantasies of an immoral nature can not only be played out in the mind, but
pursued in a virtual world where people can enact the fantasies they imagine. Imagining age play,
and habitually wishing to pursue an age play fantasy leads people to ignore their better moral
judgement and act out their imaginings within the virtual world. However, the imagination is
morally accountable, this has been proven, so the pursuit of an imaginative fantasy which might
be considered wrong is just another step down a slippery slope towards moral insensitivity and
corruption of the moral character. Imaginings can be wrong, but not harmful, this has been
displayed,. Imaginings like age play actively sought within a virtual world such as Second Life
can be wrong but not harmful too, they are therefore an example of harmless wrongdoing.
5. Conclusion  The Moral Accountability of Imagination and Virtual
World
It has been shown that immoral imaginings, and the pursuit of immoral imaginings in virtual
worlds are examples of harmless wrongdoing. In these situations, individuals entertain or pursue
immoral imaginings, and as a result cause damage to their own moral character. The examples
provided have displayed that immoral imaginings do not have victims, and do not harm anyone,
but may still be morally assessed.35 We should not entertain certain activities because doing
so degrades our moral character, and confuses our `moral compass'. Since this is the case, the
pursuit of immoral imaginings is also a case of wrongdoing. Within a virtual world nobody
is harmed when an individual seeks to live their fantasy. No child is ever harmed when age
players conduct their role play, yet we still feel that what they do is morally wrong. This is
a justified feeling since what we imagine gives evidence of our dispositions, and the possibility
that individuals will be open to immoral concepts. Not only this, the age player simply fails to
resist an imagining which is morally questionable. The lack of harm is not enough of a reason
to conclude that what age players do is not morally assessable.
As an example of harmless wrongdoing, we must approach the imagination of certain con-
cepts, and our pursuit of seemingly harmless fantasies with caution. The pursuit or entertainment
of a fantasy is not risk free, and is not exempt from moral judgement. We have the ability to
distinguish between right and wrong, and as such have a duty to resist those imaginings which
35 Once again, excluding harm to oneself of course, which is not included in the definition of harmless wrong-
doing. This only involves harm where other parties are involved.
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obviously raise moral problems. To pursue them is to ignore this important fact and show an
individual lack of moral sensitivity.
Examples of harmless wrongdoings are certainly difficult to present, and there appear to be
few examples of wrongs which are not accompanied by harm. However, immoral imagination,
and resulting conduct within a virtual world is one which fits well into Feinberg's definition
of what harmless wrongdoing consists of. The virtual world is a playground in which moral
imaginings may be acted out and represented. Imaginative objects of fantasy and desire; of
actions rejected in reality can be easily pursued. If it is wrong to imagine a child in a sexual
situation then it is certainly wrong to enter a virtual world and pursue such an imagining as
fantasy, regardless of the fact nobody is ever really harmed. Age play conducted purely in the
imagination, or within a virtual world is wrong because of the damage it does to us, and our
moral character, in entertaining and pursing immoral concepts. Immoral imaginings and their
pursuit within virtual worlds are wrongful acts without harm, and therefore suitable examples
of harmless wrongdoings.
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